Week 5- Framing Effects

Framing effects occur when different descriptions of the same decision problem give rise to predictably different preferences (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). One study into framing effects was conducted by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), whereby participants were presented with an Asian Disease problem. The researchers proposed two alternative solutions to combat the disease; the alternative programs were either presented to the participants in a positive frame or a negative frame, however, both 'acts, outcomes, and contingencies' associated with the problems were essentially the same.

For example, in the positive frame, one of the alternative programs was presented as " If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved", but in the negative frame Program A was presented as "If Program A is adopted, 400 people will die". Program B, one the other hand, was described as a more risky option; for example, in the positive frame it was described as " there is one-third probability that 600 people will be saved, and a two-third probability that no people will be saved." In the positive frame, the two alternatives can be described as gains, and in the negative frame, the alternatives can be evaluated as losses. As a result, participants overwhelmingly choose Program A when it was presented in the positive frame, and overwhelmingly choose Program B when it was presented in the negative frame.

This is in line with the Prospect Theory, as decision makers tend to be risk aversive when choosing between perceived gains and risk seeking when deciding between perceived losses. Therefore this could account to why people choose Program A in the positive frame, and choose the more risky option Program B in the negative frame. However, can framing effects be avoided?

This week we were asked to read Deep Thoughts and Shallow Frames by LeBoeuf and Shafir. This article sought to explain how framing effects can be avoided, and whether it depends on how the individual analyses the problem presented to them. In one view, framing effects can be avioded if respondants 'put more thought' to a decision problem; it was claimed that by putting more thought into a decision problem they would detect alternative ways to think about the problem (Smith, 1985). Some research has supported this view as there was a lower occurance of framings effects when participants were asked to provide justifications for their decision.

Cacioppo and Petty (1982) investigated whether framing effects are moderated by respondant's tendencies to give decisions greater thought. The Need for Cognition (NC) identifies 'differences among individuals in their tendency to engage in and enjoy thinking' (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982, p.116). Individuals with high NC tend to give greater thought; greater information search; and pay less attention to surface cues than those low in NC (Verplanken et al., 1992; Heppner et al., 1983). Although this approarch sounds promising, replications of studies into people with high and low NC have yeilded mixed results. For example in study 1 of this article (mentioned above) found that framing effects were not moderated by the degree of thought given to a problem. Both reponses of high- and low-NC participants were heavily and equally influenced by the provided frame.

In my view, I believe that everyone is susceptible to framing effects no matter how 'much thought' is put into a decision problem. Framing effects are everywhere, from advertising to voting. For example, after 9/11 American citizens had to vote on a law titled 'The Patriots Act'. It was emphasised that the law was to 'monitor its citizens for the purpose of countering terrorism', which is in my view quite vague. The title may also suggest that if US citizens do not vote for the law to be passed, then they are not Patriotic. In fact the law was signed in October 26, 2001.